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BOOK REVIEW
BACK TO THE FUTURE OF LABOR LAW
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT LAW, by Paul C. Weiler.* Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press 1990. Pp. 311. $29.95
MATTHEW W. FNKIN**
Professor Paul Weiler surveys the American workplace and is
displeased.1 He perceives a "yawning representation gap,"2 a
disjointure between the aspiration of American workers for "di-
rect indigenous ' 3 systems of meaningful participation in the de-
cisions that govern their workplace lives and determine their
working futures,4 and the almost total absence of such systems,
save for a bureaucratically remote trade union movement in sharp
decline5 Accordingly, he questions whether something in Amer-
ican law has contributed to this condition." He concludes that
such a state of affairs may well exist, that the time has come
for "a major overhaul of our labor laws," 7 and he offers a set of
proposals toward that end.
Before doing so, Professor Weiler confronts the arguments
against legal intervention in the labor market that adherents of
the "law and economics" school have assayed.8 He starts first
with an analysis of the dismissal of ostensibly "at will" employees
and later moves on to the role of labor unions Contrary to the
* Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A., Ohio Wesleyan
University, 1963; LL.B., New York University, 1967; LL.M., Yale University, 1973.
1. P. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW (1990).
2. Id. at 44.
3. Id- at 295.
4. Id-
5. I at 296-97 passim.
6. Id. at 225.
7. Id. at 226.
8. Id. at 16 passim.
9. Id. at 48 passim.
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assumptions of neo-classical economics, as Robert Solow recently
observed, "The labor market might just be different in important
ways from the market for fish."'10 And Weiler draws heavily from
a significant body of research in labor economics more fully to
confirm that observation. His assiduous martialing of the evi-
dence, his detailed explication of why that should be so, will be
helpful, perhaps even invaluable, for those who believe that an
exacting reply to modern Manchesterianism is a necessary pred-
icate for legal analysis and reform.
The concern here, however, is not with the precise contours
of Professor Weiler's economic assessment; that has been pow-
erfully analyzed elsewhere." The concern here is with the legal
landscape Professor Weiler would design; and on that account
the book contains two surprises. First, it is surprising that so
extensive a venture into "the future of labor and employment
law" should produce not a single new idea. Rather, Professor
Weiler's methodology is to canvass the current inventory of
proposals for legal change, so as to piece together from it a
package of reform. It is no less surprising that what Professor
Weiler chooses from a very wide selection offered over the years,
including some that we might consider radical even today, 2 are,
with a singular exception, a marginal adjustment to the legal
status quo in the law of individual employment and a partial
return to the legislative status quo ante the Taft-Hartley Act 3
in the law of collective bargaining. This is not to deny the merit
of many of these proposals; but it is a comment on the intellectual
state of the academy that laissez faire arguments are taken so
seriously, while a reformist program, partially undoing the re-
actionary legislation of 1947, is proposed as "a major overhaul."
I. THE WRONGFUL DISMISSAL PROBLEM
The stage is set by the change in employer policies and em-
ployee expectations from the turn of the century to the present.
10. R. SOLow, THE LABOR MARKET AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 30 (1990).
11. See Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100
YALE L.J. - (forthcoming 1991); Linder, Book Review, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY
(forthcoming 1991) (reviewing P. WEILER, supra note 1). I am indebted to Professors
Gottesman and Linder for sharing their views with me.
12. For example, the Plumb Plan would have given elected workers one-third of the
seats on the board operating the Nation's railroads after the First World War. H.R. 8157,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
13. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. SS 141-187 (1988)).
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At the turn of the century (and despite the presence of
complements of long-serving, especially-skilled employees), it
was not widely assumed that the employment relationship
would be of long duration. A common assumption rather was
of a continuing "spot market" in labor, in which incumbent
workers had to compete almost day-by-day for their jobs with
an army of the unemployed waiting at the gate.1 4
The employment relationship was generally assumed to be "at
will." In the absence of a contract expressly to the contrary, the
employee was legally free to quit for any or no reason and at
any time, and the employer was equally free to discharge for
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. One result was a
footloose independence, a willingness to quit or to strike. Another
result was a rate of employee turnover that modern standards
would consider horrendous.1
5
Today, nonunion employers-to retain stable complements of
trained employees, to reduce turnover and training costs, and to
keep unions out-have adopted structures of "internal labor
markets," lines of progression, promotion, and benefits that en-
courage long service.
One consequence is the widespread expectation-and reality-
of job security in a great many non-unionized jobs.... Another
is the dependence such creates as people come to rely upon
the job not only for a steady income, but for medical insurance
and other vital benefits, to the point of creating, in the view
of some critics, a new "industrial feudalism."16
These workplace developments run in tandem with a larger
change in what Lawrence Friedman has called the "legal culture,"
fomented or abetted by the creation of the welfare state:
Its most salient characteristic is an attitude I have called the
general expectation of justice. It stands in contrast to the
attitudes prevalent in the past: resigned fatalism, diffuse rage,
sullen apathy, or passive contentment .... [A] significant por-
tion of the population possesses a heightened sense of entitle-
ment, an expectation of possible redress in the face of calamity
or injustice. 17
14. A. Cox, D. BoK, R. GORMAN, & M. FINKIN, LABOR LAW 513-14 (11th ed. 1991).
15. Id. at 514.
16. Id. at 515.
17. L. FRIEDMAN, THE'REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 60 (1990).
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The question then is whether the law ought to come to grips
with these changed economic realities and greatened expecta-
tions, especially in terms of job security.
Professor Weller prefers to address wrongful dismissal through
the system of grievance arbitration that collective bargaining
would provide almost inevitably.18 The collectively bargained
solution to the wrongful dismissal issue, however, would turn
upon the much more widespread adoption of unionization, a
condition not likely to be realized soon. And so Professor Weiler
assays whether "second best" alternatives exist.
He rejects the judicial application of some generalized com-
munal norm of good faith or fair dealing: the transaction costs
are high; the likelihood of a jury's "erroneous" judgment is too
great; the impact of high tort damages may deter employers
from discharging employees who should be discharged; and the
benefits are likely to flow disproportionately to those financially
able to secure competent counsel.19 On the other hand, he would
maintain the tort of discharge for a reason violative of public
policy.20 On these issues, Professor Weller's recommendations
embrace the prevailing state of the law, for the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions have rejected an open-ended invitation
to juries to decide whether employers have acted fairly in the
discharge of otherwise at-will employees, save, notably, Mon-
tana;21 and, most jurisdictions that have considered the question
have held that a cause of action is available for a discharge
violative of public policy.Y
Professor Weller would allow judicial enforcement of employer
policies affording job security when there is sufficient evidence
that the employer has placed these provisions on a "voluntary,
contractual footing"23: "earlier legal barriers to a judicial finding
of more than an at-will cast to the employment relationship are
simply no longer appropriate in an economy in which employees
are typically led to believe that they will have an enduring
career"' 4 with their employer. However, he urges courts to accede
18. He does propose one modification. Noting the practice of some public sector unions,
Professor Weiler would allow the individual to pursue a discharge to arbitration if the
union declines to take the case. P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 92-93. This idea wag elaborated
upon more fully in Sands, New Developments in the Duty of Fair Representation: Practical
Problems, Practical Solutions, and Legislative Proposals, in N.Y.U. 37TH ANN. NAT'L CONF.
ON LAB. 12-1 (R. Adelman ed. 1984).
19. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 80-83.
20. See id. at 100.
21. See id. at 96; see also infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
22. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 79.
23. Id. at 100.
24. Id.
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to disclaimers of contractual obligation.25 First, he reasons that
"[t]hose employees who accept and continue in their jobs on such
an at-will basis should be held to that arrangement, even if later
they come to regret the outcome of such a status."26 Second,
judicial disregard of such provisions will deter more generous
employer treatment:
In effect, a more onerous legal liability would thus be imposed
on firms which had voluntarily taken steps to try to reduce
the incidence of unfair dismissals inside their operations, while
leaving with the luxury of at-will the less conscientious em-
ployers that made no effort to provide their workers with
reasonable protection against arbitrary treatment by their
managers.2
Third at work is Weiler's "skeptical appraisal of the operation
of wrongful dismissal litigation."' As he explains, "the substantial
burden that the experience and the prospect of such lawsuits
now imposes on employers . . . is simply not warranted by the
kinds of relief and protection actually obtained by ordinary work-
ers whose lack of bargaining power initially inspired judicial
concern. '" Finally, he argues to authority: "[S]o far no court has
been prepared to invalidate such contractual waivers of legal
liability."' -
In this, too, he endorses the legal status quo, for most courts
that have recognized the contractual status of unilaterally prom-
ulgated employer policies have also acceded to boilerplate dis-
claimers of contractual status. Most, but not all. Other courts,
by denying employers summary judgment on the basis of such
25. See id.
26. I&
27. Id. at 54-55. If this is sound, there is no reason why a court should require a
disclaimer at all; why, that is, it should not simply hold such rules to be noncontractual,
as has the Supreme Court of Nevada. Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 777 P.2d 366, 369-70
(Nev. 1989):
Standardized disciplinary procedures are generally positive additions to a
business. They provide employers a method of cautioning employees, and
afford employees an opportunity to improve job performance in order to
retain employment. They also create a general consistency and security in
the work place. If we were to hold that the establishment of standard
disciplinary procedures for employees is, in and of itself, sufficient to convert
an at-will employee to an employee who can be fired only for cause, employers
would be reluctant to continue to establish them.
28. P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 101.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 55.
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boilerplate have not been loath to allow juries to invalidate
them.31 I am far less persuaded than Professor Weiler by the
soundness of the majority view.
This is not to deny that the importance of a legal theory is to
be tested, at least in part, by its conformity "with the principles
followed by the courts in decided cases. 3 2 But it is to inquire
what the normative principle is and whether the majority view
on disclaimers is in conformity with it. In other settings, courts
have disregarded employer disclaimers of legal obligation or of
the contractual status of bonuses, benefits, or other rules when
the consequence of acceding to the disclaimer would be to nullify
the underlying obligation.33 The larger principle is that an em-
ployer may not take away with one hand what the employer
gives with another.
If this principle is sound, then none of the arguments Professor
Weller assays are persuasive. As to the claim of voluntariness,
one has to be careful to attend to the nature of the disclaimer.
If the employee is hired truly "at will," conveying that message
31. To select but two decisions that antedate Professor Weiler's book, the manual in
Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841 (1987), provided in pertinent part
that it was intended "[tlo provide all of us as Coleman employees of the Company, through
written reference, a better understanding of our privileges and obligations which are an
inherent part of our employment. Nothing in this policy manual should be construed as
an employment contract or guarantee of employment." Id. at 506, 738 P.2d at 844 (emphasis
partially added). Nevertheless, and observing that "Ithe disclaimer . . .does not as a
matter of law determine the issue," id. at 514, 738 P.2d at 849, the court held that the
trial court should not have granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. Id. at
518, 738 P.2d at 851. So, too, the disclaimer in Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473 (10th
Cir. 1988), provided:
This Personnel Policy Manual is made available to all Zale Corporation
management personnel as a guide to be used in making decisions or com-
municating information on personnel matters. The text is a compilation of
past policies and procedures, previously unwritten customs, and recent
developments. Collectively, it contains the current personnel policies, prac-
tices, and procedures of the company.
While every effort has been made to create a manual which is specific as
possible the policies and procedures set forth are a guideline and are not
intended to cover and cannot cover every contingency, circumstance or
situation. This manual is not intended and shall not be interpreted to be a
formal legal contract, binding on the company.
Id. at 1476 n.5. Observing that "[a] contractual disclaimer does not automatically negate
a document's contractual status," id., the court reversed the district court's award of
summary judgment for the employer. Id.; see also Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co., 714
F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
32. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
663, 664 (1973).
33. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REV. 547, 553-54 (reviewing authority).
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emphatically would be perfectly appropriate, and the employer
would accordingly take the risks attendant to attracting the kinds
of employees willing to work on that basis.3 Such an approach
is distinguishable from the promulgation of rules assuring job
security-progressive discipline, fair evaluation, or just cause for
discharge-while simultaneously disclaiming that the employer
legally need act in accord with them. Such a disclaimer is not
really directed to the employee, who is likely to hear only the
substantive promise;s the disclaimer is directed to the courts.
From this perspective, the argument for the deterrence of
conscientious employers and the reward of less conscientious
ones is misplaced. A conscientious employer will not make sub-
stantive commitments that it is unwilling to honor and should
not hesitate to say so. The opportunistic employer would want
the power legally to escape its obligation. Consider the situation
that would exist if Professor Weiler's university promulgated the
following in its Faculty Handbook:
Notice of Non-reappointment and Reappointment: It will be
the practice of the University, without contractual obligation
to do so, to give written notice at the following times to officers
of instruction whose services are no longer required: A) Deans
will give notice each year to those whose terms expire and
whom they do not propose to recommend for reappointment,
not later than December 15 of that year . . .s
It would be interesting to hear Professor Weiler explain to a
junior colleague, who learns on June 20 that her appointment
34. Cf. Yazujian v. J. Rich Steers, Inc., 195 Misc. 694, 701, 89 N.Y.S.2d 551, 558 (1949):
If this contract meant what defendants now claim it means, it was their
duty to express that meaning in unmistakable language. The contract was
not designed for signature by persons skilled in the law. If defendants wished
to have the right to fire at will they could have stated, in type at least as
large as that in which they set forth the employee's representation that "he
fully understands its terms and conditions", somewhat as follows: "The
Employee agrees that he may be fired from his job at any time for any
reason or no reason." It is doubtful that applicants for jobs would flock to
defendants' offices were their intention in this regard so plainly stated.
35. The permanent strike replacements at the New York Daily News have signed what
the reportage has called a "release," giving management the right to discharge at will.
Kilborn, The Daily News Strike Tests the Will of Weakened Labor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1991, at 1, col. 1. As one replacement told the reporter, however, "'I have been hired
for good' .... 'That's what I was told when I was hired. I believe them:" Id.
36. Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (emphasis added)
(quoting the Faculty Handbook of Howard University).
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will not be continued after its expiration on June 30, why judicial
accedence to the disclaimer will conduce toward greater admin-
istrative conscientiousness. The District of Columbia Circuit was
not so persuaded.7
Nor do I see the logic in refusing to give effect to these
obligations because the beneficiaries will not be "ordinary" work-
ers. Professor Weiler nowhere explains how those who would
seek to vindicate their rights under unilaterally promulgated
employer policies differ from "ordinary" workers. "Extraordi-
nary" workers would command individually negotiated contracts
of employment containing detailed provisions governing duration,
remuneration, and discharge. Employers, however, have urged
the legal vitality of boilerplate disclaimers in unilaterally prom-
ulgated employer policies with a fine impartiality to deny the
contract claims of truck drivers,38 couriers,9 assembly line work-
ers,40 technicians,41 other hourly employees, tellers," secretar-
ies, sales personnel,45 nurses,46 mental health care workers,47
and low level managers.4 Even if some blue collar workers find
it more difficult financially to vindicate their rights under these
policies than some white collar workers, that scarcely seems a
principled ground to deny the latter their rights.
Having exhausted the current catalogue of common law alter-
natives, Professor Weiler turns to the possibility of legislation
and takes as his object lesson Montana's 1987 Wrongful Discharge
From Employment Act,49 "the first time an American legislature
had treated the matter."' 0 His concern is with both the manner
of administration and the remedy. Reinstatement, he notes, is
37. Id. at 1135.
38. See Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 55 Wash. App. 917, 781 P.2d 900 (1989).
39. See White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536 (E.D. Va. 1990).
40. See Pyle v. Ledex, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 3d 139, 551 N.E.2d 205 (1988).
41. See McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990).
42. See Gale v. Hayes Microcomputer Prod., 192 Ga. App. 30, 383 S.E.2d 590 (1989)
($5.40 per hour).
43. See Audette v. Northeast State Bank, 436 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
44. See Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 910 (ND. Ill. 1989).
45. See Kramer v. Medical Graphics Corp., 710 F. Supp. 1144 (ND. Ohio 1989); Uebelacker
v. Cincom Sys., Inc., 48 Ohio App. 3d 268, 549 N.E.2d 1210 (1988).
46. See Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989).
47. See Bennett v. Evanston Hosp., 184 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 540 N.E.2d 979 (1989).
48. See Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn.
1989); Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Ariz. 1988); Tohline v. Central
Trust Co., 48 Ohio App. 3d 280, 549 N.E.2d 1223 (1988).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. S 39-2-901 (1987).
50. P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 96.
1012 [Vol. 32:1005
BACK TO THE FUTURE
unlikely to be viable in the absence of a union for reasons he
develops,51 but which Professor Martha West has argued more
powerfully elsewhere. 52 Furthermore, monetary awards pose a
"dilemma":
[A] legal remedy that pays only modest amounts of lost wages
seems to trivialize the argument [that the wrongful loss of the
job is a serious deprivation], to undermine the claim that this
is such an important priority for employment law reform. Yet
if the proponent of job tenure responds to this argument by
agreeing to escalate the size of the remedy (that is, by valuing
the lost job at tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars),
the risk of erroneous awards against employers becomes too
significant (at least in the American constitutional culture) for
these cases to be entrusted to an administrative tribunal rather
than to a court, notwithstanding the substantial cost of pro-
viding due process in the court system. This is the apparently
insoluble dilemma of the discharge issue 3
Montana has resolved the question by capping recovery in a
fashion that tends to trivialize the remedy and preempts any
additional common law claim for discharge, leaving at least some
employees worse off than they were before the statute. One
legislature that is at least titularly American, however, that of
the United States Virgin Islands, enacted a law in 1986 that
gives an administrative remedy and judicial relief "for compen-
satory and punitive damages" to any employee who is dismissed
without just cause.5' In other words, the American experience
may evidence that the choice is not quite as stark as Professor
Weiler's dilemma would suggest.
Given his assumption, however, Professor Weiler proposes a
modest statutory floor for those "who have a distinctive need
for help ' 55 amounting to a scheduled benefit for a termination
51. Id. at 86.
52. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
1.
53. P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 85.
54. V.J. CODE ANN. tit. 24, % 76-79 (Supp. 1990). The law exempts employers when a
contract modifies the statutory obligation, id. S 76, but the territorial Supreme Court
held that an employee's statement that the employee understands that the employer has
the right to terminate him at any time, signed at the time the employee was hired, was
ineffective to modify the statutory obligation. James v. West Indian Burgers, Inc., 24
V.I. 67 (1988) (statement that existed in an informational document was not an employment
contract for the purpose of the Act).
55. P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 102.
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without just cause, administered akin to unemployment compen-
sation. Even here, however, Professor Weiler would crib on the
commitment:
A statute should be drafted which affords such protection only
to workers who have a distinctive need for legal help: one
would exclude those still mobile employees who invested a
relatively short period of service with their employer, and also
those people who are sufficiently high in the corporate struc-
ture that they can be expected to negotiate a "parachute" of
their own.6
I disagree with Professor Weller's underlying assumption. Un-
employment compensation is presumptively available for those
who need to maintain an income stream while seeking employ-
ment. Compensation here should be irrespective of economic
need-though need may well exist. If a statute is to require
compensation, it should be for the wrongful termination of the
employment relationship, for the blow to one's status and the
dislocation of one's life.57
This proposal would work a change, but not an especially
dramatic one. A 1981 survey of over 1,300 responding companies
indicated that employer severance pay policies cover sixty-five
percent of the office personnel of large companies, forty percent
of the office personnel of smaller companies, and thirty-five
percent of nonoffice employees (mostly unionized workers).s Av-
erage compensation tends to be modest, a flat two weeks' pay
for most, but progression in accordance with longevity is built
into others 9 Professor Weiler's proposal, in other words, would
require that all employees be given, as a matter of law, what a
significant minority now enjoy as a matter of employer policy or
collective agreement.
Such legislation would not be unprecedented. In 1949, the
legislature of another titularly American jurisdiction, Puerto Rico,
56. Id.
57. I am dubious, moreover, about the practical need for these exemptions. An exemp-
tion for high level employees would be unnecessary to the extent their "parachutes"
exceed the statutory floor. An exemption during relatively brief periods of probation
would be defensible, but Professor Weiler would exempt those of "short service" without
further explanation.
58. Conference Board, Rep. No. 813, Profile of Employee Benefits 46 (1981).
59. In other words, and in contrast to the proposed statutory exclusion of those of
short service, most employer severance pay policies are geared to compensating those of
short service essentially for mistaken hiring.
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required a month's pay as an "indemnity" for the discharge
without cause of nonprobationary employees serving without a
definite term.60 This was extended in 1976 to include "an addi-
tional progressive indemnity equivalent to one week for each
year of service."6' 1
I find Professor Weiler's package of proposals passing strange.
He argues that, absent a union, there is almost a "total absence
of voluntary agreements between employers and individual work-
ers which would provide a contractual guarantee of tenure in the
job."8 2 Professor Weiler takes this as evidence of market failure
inasmuch as unionized employees invariably secure such protec-
tion, so to argue for the legislation he proposes:
Especially now that thousands of court cases have made it
clear how often American management arbitrarily wields its
authority to fire long-service employees, it stretches the imag-
ination beyond belief to suppose that there is no context in
which such a guarantee would be worth more to nonunion
workers than it would cost their employers to provide it to
them.P
Professor Weiler ignores the fact that many of these thousands
of cases concern the contractual status of employer promises of
job security, either given informally, in the course of discussion
about the job and its prospects, or as a matter of promulgated
policy. Courts have often denied the former on grounds of the
legal indefiniteness of the commitment," by a wooden application
of the rule requiring consideration additional to the performance
of services to render a commitment to "permanent" employment
enforceable, 65 in a few cases by an even more wooden application
of the doctrine of mutuality of obligation,6 6 and by the frequent
application of the statute of frauds to oral commitments of greater
than a year's duration. 67 Courts have denied the latter by genu-
flection to boilerplate disclaimers. Professor Weiler does not
60. 1949 P.R. LAWS 50.
61. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, S 185a (1985).
62. P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 72. For a slightly different formulation of the same
arguments, see id. at 78.
63. Id.
64. See 1 H. SPECTER & M. FINKIN, INDIVIDuAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION S 2.10
(1989).
65. Id. S 2.11.
66. Id. S 1.06.
67. Id. S 1.18.
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discuss the former body of law, but he does endorse the latter-
notwithstanding his condemnation of "legal barriers to a judicial
finding of more than an at-will" relationship.68
Contrary to Professor Weiler, it is not that employers do not
give commitments to job security and, because of market failure,
law is needed to fill in the gap. Rather, employers often do lead
employees "to believe that they will have an enduring career,"
but the law refuses to enforce such promises.6 9 What Professor
Weller proposes in the latter case, however, is to have courts
strip ordinary workers of their common law rights and give them
instead a scheduled benefit-which should not be of more than
a "floor" lest the remedial structure be skewed unduly in favor
of middle managers, who somehow are less worthy of legal
solicitude than the "ordinary" workers for whose benefit this
proposal was devised.70
II. DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND REFORM OF THE
LABOR ACT
The means most available to close the "representation gap" is
unionization, but, for a variety of reasons that Professor Weiler
surveys,71 the labor movement has been in decline for more than
two decades. One of the contributing factors might be the Labor
Act itself, and Weller considers a variety of legal changes that
might create a fairer environment for the selection of union
representation and the exercise of collective bargaining.72 He
endorses most, but not quite all, of them. This is an area that
he has worked over before.73 On further reflection, he now rec-
ommends (1) "instant elections" for union representation, (2) tort
damages for individuals discharged for union activity, (3) com-
pensatory damages for employer refusals to bargain in good faith,
(4) a substantial curtailment of the employer's power to hire
permanent strike replacements, and (5) modification of the law
of secondary boycotts under section 8(b)(4) to allow unions to
68. See P. WE LER, supra note 1, at 101.
69. See, e.g., Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. App. 1986)
(assurance to prospective employee that the position offered "was for a permanent career
position ... [which] would definitely last until my normal retirement at age 65" stated
only an at-will job).
70. See P. WMLER, supra note 1, at 101-03.
71. See id. at 105-33.
72. See id passim.
73. See Weiler, infra note 74; Weiler, infra note 89.
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picket struck products. I am in sympathy with all of these
recommendations. None are new.
A. Instant Elections
In an earlier piece, and relying upon Canadian provincial leg-
islation, Professor Weiler argued for the certification of unions
simply on the basis of a union designation card count.74 On the
basis of the recent introduction of the "instant election" 75 in two
Canadian provinces, Nova Scotia and British Columbia, he now
argues for the adoption of that system here. In his earlier piece,
Professor Weiler noted that the Labor Act prior to Taft-Hartley
contemplated certification of a union upon a card count and the
NLRB utilized that approach until, by decision in 1939, the Board
abandoned that alternative in preference for a secret ballot
election. 6 Thus, he properly noted that a certification upon a
card count "would not be alien to the American experience. '7
Neither would instant elections. On November 27, 1945, the
NLRB amended its Rules and Regulations to insert footnote two
in section 203.3: "At any stage of the investigation, either before
hearing or after hearing but before transfer of the case to the
Board, the regional director may in cases which present no
substantial issues, conduct a secret ballot of the employees, or
he may decline to continue the investigation. '78 In other words,
the Rules provided for instant elections.79
Neither the instant election nor a return to nonelectoral means
of determining majority support would be a radical idea. For
example, New York's public employee collective bargaining law
allows for the determination of representation status "on the
basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidences."'
Membership plus designation of representation from substantially
more than a majority of the unit should obviate the need for an
election, as dissenting Board member Smith argued in 1939.8'
74. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
75. P. WEmER, supra note 1, at 255.
76. Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).
77. Weiler, supra note 74, at 1806 n.137.
78. 10 Fed. Reg. 14,499 (1945).
79. The Board's Annual Report emphasized this. 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1945).
80. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW S 207(2) (Consol. 1982).
81. Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 533 (1939) (Smith, dissenting).
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B. Tort Damages for Discriminatory Discharge
Earlier Professor Weller made a compelling case for the weak-
ness of the Act's remedial scheme for discharge due to union
activity.8 2 He now explains:
When the NLRA was enacted in the mid-thirties, employ-
ment at will was the prevailing common law regime, so it
seemed reasonable to confine the scope of the new legislative
intervention within the strict compass of contract remedies (in
fact, the range was even narrower). A half-century later, the
legal environment has been transformed .... [M]ost states
now recognize a tort action for the individual employee who
has been fired in contravention of some identifiable public
policy, such as for exercising the right to file for workers'
compensation benefits.P
He argues that a discharge for this reason should be subject to
the same relief as any other discharge for a reason violative of
public policy and that the preemptive effect of the NLRA on the
state's ability to afford such a remedy should be eliminated.
The same conclusion has been drawn more recently by Michael
Gottesman, but by a different line of historical reasoning and
with greater analytical power.85 The draftsmen of the Labor Act
did not confine the remedial scheme to within the "compass of
contract remedies," for that would have implicated the possibility
of a right to jury trial under the seventh amendment. Rather,
the proponents of the Wagner Act desired to commit its
enforcement to an administrative agency that could bring spe-
cialized expertise to the eradication of the practices against
which the bill was aimed-a choice that meant there would
not be jury trials. . . In due course, Congress' decision to
limit the monetary remedy to backpay accompanying reinstate-
ment enabled the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
to reject the ensuing seventh amendment challenge on the
familiar ground that the amendment "has no application to
cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to
equitable relief." Hence, Congress' limiting the remedies as it
82. See Weiler, supra note 74.
83. P. WE LER, supra note 1, at 248.
84. See id. at 249.
85. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization,
7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990).
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did in order to commit enforcement to an administrative agency
furnishes no justification for inferring an intent to preclude
stronger remedies in court actions under state law.8
Inasmuch as Professor Weiler elsewhere recommends modifi-
cation of federal law to achieve his ends, however, his choice not
to seek a federal course of action here is puzzling. Indeed, in
1961 a subcommittee of the United States House of Representa-
tives recommended the creation of a civil action for double or
triple damages plus attorney fees in such cases.
C. Compensatory Damages for Refusals to Bargain
In an earlier consideration of the weakness of refusal to bargain
remedies, Professor Weiler recommended, again on the basis of
the Canadian experience, the arbitration of the first contract of
a newly certified union. He no longer finds that proposal feasible
and recommends instead a cause of action for refusals to bargain
that would make employees whole for their employer's illegal
behavior.88 He noted in a footnote to his earlier piece that the
Board had rejected that remedy in 1970 on the ground that it
lacked the necessary power8 The Board did so, however, by the
narrowest of margins and in the context of three trial examiners'
conclusions to the contrary. After twenty years it may well be
a reform whose time has come.
D. Strike Replacements
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court, in dictum, allowed
employers to resist economic strikes by hiring permanent re-
placementsP Scholars have since spilt a lot of ink on that ques-
tion. Professor Weiler has argued that employers should be
required to show legitimate business necessity as a precondition
of permanence, and he reiterates that position here.9 1 Such a
change in law would easily fit into the general framework of
86. Id. at 408-09 (citation omitted).
87. See O'Hara & Pollitt, Section 8(a)(3) of the Labor Act: Problems and Legislative
Proposals, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1104, 1125 (1968).
88. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 250-51.
89. See Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for
Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 360 n.29 (1984) (citing Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185
N.L.R.B. 107, 108-09 (1970)).
90: NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 338, 345-46 (1938).
91. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 267.
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section 8(a)(3) analysis that the Supreme Court developed. But it
is, at best, a half measure. Professor Weiler suggests that few
employers will actually be able to prove that they "needed to
promise permanent tenure to replacements in order to maintain
[their] operations."' The perhaps shocking answer is that we do
not know. Shocking because virtually no empirical research exists
on when and why employers avail themselves of permanent
replacements, what jobs they occupy, what they are paid as
compared to the strikers, or how long they tend to stay. Professor
Weiler buttresses his approach by stressing how tepid in legal
reality the promise of permanence is:
What employers actually promise replacements is most accu-
rately characterized not as permanent tenure in their jobs, but
only priority over the strikers in the allocation of available
jobs at the end of the strike....
Moreover, if the union manages to bring to bear on the
employer enough strike pressure to win a decent settlement,
the agreement will almost invariably provide for rehiring the
strikers and dislodging the replacements. So all the employer
really offers its replacements is the chance that they will retain
their jobs at the end of the strike.9 3
By this reasoning, the employer would have to show that it
could not continue its business by internal transfers, by the
utilization of supervisory or managerial personnel, or by seeking
to hire persons to whom it had offered no chance that they would
retain their jobs at the end of the strike before the employer
could hire those to whom it offered a chance of retaining their
jobs after the strike. I imagine that this burden would not be so
difficult, depending upon the jobs at stake and the nature of the
labor market.
More importantly, I am skeptical of Professor Weiler's assess-
ment of the consequence of "permanence. 94 The promise of
permanence traditionally has entailed a commitment not to be
displaced in strike settlement. For reasons explored elsewhere,
such a commitment may preclude a strike settlement returning
the strikers to their jobs because of the contractual status of
such commitments as a matter of state law. Thus, it becomes
92. Id
93. Id. at 268.
94. See Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REv. 547.
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much more important to limit the employer's ability to replace
a worker permanently if one is to maintain a statutory regime
of collective bargaining.
Some employees' skills are such that an employer cannot read-
fly replace them. The labor market may effectively constrain the
employer's ability to avail itself of the privilege to replace. I see
no reason why the law should not create a parallel prohibition
for those for whom the labor market would not so constrain
employer behavior.
Indeed, Professor Weiler proposes an alternative rule, again
predicated upon Canadian precedent, to prohibit permanent re-
placement for a six-month period from the date of the strike.9 5
In effect, this would place a six-month limit on strikes in which
the employees are vulnerable to replacement. It is difficult to
assess the proposal without study of the experience under it. But
the old adage is that the employer cannot take a short strike
and the union cannot take a long one. If so, if the parties have
not resolved the strike in six months, it may well be time for
the union to call it off. If, however, employers in highly seasonal
industries could induce a strike as they enter the off-season, they
could hire their way out of the strike (and out of unionization)
at the expiration of the moratorium period. The simpler approach
would be a flat prohibition upon permanent replacement.
E. Boycotting Struck Products
Professor Weiler explains why section 8(b)(4) should be modified
to allow a striking union to ask fellow workers not to provide
services to, or handle products from, a struck employer. As he
notes, the gravamen of his reasoning was advanced by Howard
Lesnick in 1962.98
F. Including Managers
Professor Weiler is critical of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.9 to exclude
95. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 268.
96. See Livernash, The Relation of Power to the Structure and Process of Collective
Bargaining, 6 J.L. & EcoN. 10, 15 (1963).
97. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 269-73.
98. See id. at 271 n.56.
99. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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managerial employees from the Act's coverage, 1' ° and of its later
decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva University'a' to apply a very exten-
sive notion of managerial status into the situation of professional
employees.10 2 Not only the logic but the consequences of these
decisions trouble him:
When these legal decisions are placed side by side with the
vast expansion of the managerial structure in American enter-
prise, with the proliferation of staff positions in the head office,
the result is that growing numbers of American workers are
denied any access to the NLRA and forced to rely on their
attenuated bargaining power as individuals in the open mar-
ket.103
I share his belief that these decisions, especially Yeshiva, are
not easily defended'04 and have the potential of denying statutory
protection to a significant and growing segment of the labor
market. I am puzzled, however, for these are the very employees
whose rights under employer policies Professor Weiler would
eviscerate by having courts accede to boilerplate disclaimers on
the ground that they would be disproportionately benefitted in
contradistinction to "ordinary" workers.
Moreover, Professor Weller's expression of solicitude echoes
against his total neglect of a segment of the labor market that
is far more precariously situated economically, whom Marc
100. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 216.
101. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
102. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 216.
103. Id.
104. In criticizing the illogic of Yeshiva, I once conjured up a hypothetical case as a
reductio ad absurdum:
Assume, for example, that there is an institution where the faculty has no
voice in the fashioning of educational policy . . . . Assume further that
faculty elects a union and bargains for a system of committees and the like
that gives them a voice in the development of educational policy. In order
to be fully consistent, the Court would have to hold that once that role is
secured-even by collective agreement-the employees become ousted of
the Act's protection. But that would make no sense at all, for it is perfectly
clear that these employees. . . perform functions as a result of management's
concessions to their claims; they do not act on the employer's behalf but act
in their own collective interest pursuant to a collective agreement. Thus it
seems to me most unlikely that the Court would reach so bizarre a conclusion.
Finkin, The Yeshiva Decision: A Somewhat Different View, 7 J.C. & U.L. 321, 324 (1980-
81). The NLRB later reached exactly that "bizarre" result. See College of Osteopathic
Medicine and Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
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Linder'0 5 and others106 have treated in a valuable body of schol-
arship, such as homeworkers, agricultural workers, and persons
classified as "independent contractors." They enjoy few, if any,
of the benefits accorded ordinary workers, they are exempted
from the Labor Act, and they may be in far greater need of
unionization than managers and professionals.
IM. "CLOSING THE REPRESENTATION GAP"'0 7
One would expect an extended essay on the "future of Amer-
ican labor and employment law" to dwell upon the future needs
of American workers-their anxieties and felt necessities. I sus-
pect that such a list would include issues of workplace health
and safety; maintenance of medical and pension benefits; job
security and insurance against job loss; and a less tangible but
no less deeply felt concern for "respect" as an individual' 8 for
fair treatment and for recognition of individual privacy and
dignity. Though collective representation may be expected to
address many of these, I am not at all sure that a "representation
gap" would be perceived by a great many workers as an issue
they independently would press.' °9 Yet that is Professor Weiler's
singular focus. Toward that end, he makes two proposals for
closing that gap. First, he would repeal section 8(a)(2) of the
Labor Act-the "company union" prohibition."0 Considerable con-
troversy exists concerning the role of this provision in blunting
employer efforts to involve employees in the internal government
of the workplace. Professor Weller's solution, whatever its merits,
at least recognizes that the legislature must decide policy on this
question-not a revisionist NLRB or courts who feel free to
105. See Linder, What Is an Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 LAW &
INEQUALITY 155 (1989); Linder, Paternalistic State Intervention: The Contradictions of the
Legal Empowerment of Vulnerable Workers, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 733 (1990); Linder,
Towards Universal Worker Coverage Under the National Labor Relations Act: Making
Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66
U. DET. L. REV. 555 (1989).
106. See, e.g., R. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY,
PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989).
107. P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 307.
108. M. LENDLER, JUST THE WORKING LIFE: OPPOSITION AND ACCOMMODATION IN DAILY
INDUSTRIAL LIFE 102 (1990).
109. Blue collar workers especially do not appear to be deeply interested in participating
directly in managerial decisions other than those they perceive as having an immediate
impact upon themselves. For one participant observer's attempt to explain why that is
so, see id.
110. See P. WEILER, supra note 1, at 193, 214 n.39.
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disregard the plain language and intent of the law because they
think it now an "anachronism.""'
Second, Professor Weiler recognizes that employer-established
committees, quality circles, and the like, however they may
conduce toward greater productivity, product quality, or em-
ployee morale, will not have the kind of independence necessary
for an authentic system of "direct indigenous" employee repre-
sentation.1 2 He proposes accordingly to mandate a system of
Employee Participation Committees (EPCs)"3 along the line of
German works councils-a model much discussed in American
literature."4
I find the proposed EPCs difficult to square with two features
of Professor Weiler's general critique. First, he argues that we
"rely far too much on the law for resolving labor problems, be
it under the NLRB or in other contexts." 115 What he proposes,
however, is yet more law. Second, his argument is built upon
the assumption of an unfilled need for "direct indigenous" forms
of representation. Yet Professor Weller would have a mandate
from above fill that need: a law to command and, presumably, to
supervise the establishment of such systems.
Given the NLRB's dismal record in recent years, I am less
sanguine about the capacity of government effectively to achieve
the end Professor Weller desires. But it seems to me that means
are readily available for fostering truly "direct" and "indigenous"
forms of representation. The Labor Act does not forbid "members
only" representation."l6 Spontaneous protests by work groups in
the nonunionized workplace are protected; and Clyde Summers
has recently suggested that a more than colorable argument
exists for a duty to bargain on a members only basis in the
absence of an exclusive representative. 7 Even if the Labor Act
is not so read, Michael Gottesman's rethinking of preemption
argues for a potential role for state law to protect such systems."8
Either of these approaches would foster the "direct indigenous"
111. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293 (6th
Cir. 1982), stating that "the adversarial model of labor relations is an anachronism."
112. See P. WEmER, supra note 1, at 200-20.
113. See id. at 282-95, 310.
114. See id. at 284 n.73.
115. Id. at 275.
116. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236-37 (1938).
117. See Summers, Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CH[-]KENT L. REv. -
(forthcoming 1991) (Piper Lecture).
118. See Gottesman, supra note 85. Professor Gottesman has more recently suggested
a narrower mandated workplace safety committee. Gottesman, supra note 11.
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participation of employees, "from the ground up" so to speak,
with a minimum accretion of legal regulation. They may well be
pointing to the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Weiler's is the first effort, offered at this time of
rapid economic, demographic, and legal change, to piece together
a comprehensive picture of how the law ought to deal with the
employment relationship. It is, for that reason, a path-finding
work; and as such, it has sought to be guided by whatever
signposts thus far exist. Consequently, the value of the book may
lie less in its particular proposals than in the fact of the effort
having been made. Goveri-ng the Workplace should stimulate a
far-reaching debate; and in this, Professor Weiler has performed
an invaluable service.
